From Ideology to the Final Solution -

The Decision to kill the Jews and the Wannsee Conference

edited by Ephraim Kaye
SPEECH BY HITLER - JANUARY 30, 1941

On January 30, 1939, Hitler issued the following threat against the Jews during an address to the Reichstag:

"Today I will once more be a prophet: If the international Jewish financiers in and outside Europe should succeed in plunging the nations once more into a world war, then the result will not be the bolshevization of the earth, and thus the victory of Jewry, but the annihilation of the Jewish face in Europe!"

He repeated this same threat on September 1, 1939 (the outbreak of hostilities, World War II), on Jan 30, 1941 in the Berlin Sportpalast, and likewise on January 30, 1942 and September 30, 1942.

On September 30, 1942, six months after the gas chambers began to operate, he recalled his speech of 1939. This time he was more specific about the outcome:

"In my Reichstag speech of September 1, 1939, I have spoken of two things: first, that now that the war has been forced upon us, no array of weapons and no passage of time will bring us to defeat, and second, that if Jewry should plot another World War in order to exterminate the Aryan peoples in Europe, it would not be the Aryan peoples which would be exterminated but Jewry......

At one time, the Jews of Germany laughed about my prophecies. I do not know whether they are still laughing or whether they have already lost all desire to laugh. But right now, I can only repeat: they will stop laughing everywhere and I shall be right also in that prophecy."

Fleming, pg. 19
Deborah Lipstadt - Denying the Holocaust, pg. 61-62
Documents Pg. 134-5
SPECIAL DUTIES FOR THE SS IN "OPERATION BARBAROSSA," MARCH 13, 1941

March 13, 1941

Staff Command Secret Document
Chief Only
Only Through Officer
High Command of the Wehrmacht
WFST (Armed Forces Operational Staff) Div. L (IV/Qu)
No. 44125/41 g.K.Cheifs

Orders for Special Areas in Connection with Directive No. 21
(Operation Barbarossa)

b) Within the area of Army operations the Reichsführer SS will be entrusted, on behalf of the Führer, with special tasks for the preparation of the political administration - tasks which derive from the decisive struggle that will have to be carried out between the two opposing political systems. Within the framework of these tasks, the Reichsführer SS will act independently and on his own responsibility. Apart from this, the executive power vested in the Supreme Commander of the Army and in command levels acting under his orders will not be affected. The Reichsführer SS will ensure that operations are not interfered with by the execution of his tasks. Details will be worked out directly between the High Command of the Army and the Reichsführer SS...

Documents Pg. 375
EINSATZGRUPPEN
APRIL - 1941

When World War II broke out, twelve to fourteen Death's Head regiments, among other units and organizations, were poised to carry out Himmler's 'special tasks'. As German conquests in Europe progressed, the Death's Head Units were used as the terror arm of the Nazi regime.

In Operation Barbarossa, which began on 22 June 1941, two principles of Nazi ideology converged: the desire for 'Lebensraum' (living space) and the destruction of the Jews. It was clear to Hitler that the Jews had no place in this 'Lebensraum', and in this way he in fact determined the fate not only of the local Jews, but also of all Jews who would later be sent to the occupied Soviet territories.

At the end of January of that year, in a meeting with senior SS commanders, Himmler spoke of 30 million people who must 'disappear' in the East. It was apparently in this connection and during a discussion on the treatment of the local populations in those areas that Hitler first informed Himmler of his plans for the Jews in the territories to be conquered in the East early in 1941. At that meeting, about which we have no details, Hitler gave the task of murdering the Jews to the SS and asked Himmler to make all necessary preparations to begin the mass murder upon the invasion of the Soviet Union.

During this preparatory stage, Heydrich conducted a series of discussions with army commanders, in order to coordinate activities relating to the murder of the Jews and to prevent possible friction between army officers and the security police. As a result of these discussions, the Army High Command issued a series of orders and directives defining the areas of operation of Himmler's forces in performing the 'special tasks'.

The formation of the 'Einsatzgruppen', the special action commandos whose main assignment was murdering the Jews, was completed in late April 1941. Besides the command staff, most of whom were senior officers in the RSHA, the units consisted of members of the Security Police (Sipo) and professionals, both from the Waffen-SS and civilian draftees who had no previous connection with the SS or the police. The nucleus of the 'Einsatzgruppen' included the Security Police and SD units which were previously intended for activities in the Balkans and connected with the invasion of England.
In early May, the 'Einsatzgruppen' gathered at the school for the border police in the town of Pretzsch, where they were joined by Reserve Battalion Nine of the regular police (Orpa). The men were divided into companies and assigned to the four 'Einsatzgruppen' forming at that time.

The 'Einsatzgruppen' left their bases on 23 June 1941, in order to begin their activities, the primary one being the murder of the Jews. When they reached the front, some of these units joined the advancing German army.

Yehoshua Buchler - pg. 12
4. EXTRACT FROM THE COMMISSAR'S ORDER FOR
"OPERATION BARBAROSSA," JUNE 6, 1941

June 6, 1941

Staff Command Secret Document
Chief Only
Only Through Officer
High Command of the Wehrmacht
WFST (Armed Forces Operational Staff) Div. L.(VI/Qu)
No. 44822/41 g.K Chiefs

GUIDELINES FOR THE TREATMENT OF POLITICAL COMMISSARS

In the fight against Bolshevism it is not to be expected that the enemy will act in accordance with the principles of humanity or international law. In particular, the political commissars of all kinds, who are the real bearers of resistance, can be expected to mete out treatment to our prisoners that is full of hate, cruel and inhuman.

The army must be aware of the following:

1. In this battle it would be mistaken to show mercy or respect for international law towards such elements. They constitute a danger to our own security and to the rapid pacification of the occupied territories.

2. The barbaric, Asiatic fighting methods are originated by the political commissars. Action must therefore be taken against them immediately, without further consideration, and with all severity. Therefore, when they are picked up in battle or resistance, they are, as a matter of principle, to be finished immediately with a weapon.

In addition, the following regulations are to be observed.

OPERATIONAL AREAS

1) Political commissars operating against our armies are to be dealt with in accordance with the decree on judicial provisions in the area of "Barbarossa". This applies to commissars of every type and rank, even if they are only suspected of resistance, sabotage or incitement to sabotage....
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE EINSATZGRUPPEN - 17.5.41 - 22.6.41

There were a number of briefings about the aims and activities of the Einsatzgruppen in the Nazi-occupied territories of the Soviet Union. The first took place in Pretsch, and it was conducted by Bruno Streckenbach, Chief of Department One of the RSHA. Streckenbach acted as spokesman for Himmler and Heydrich in explaining the Fuhrer's order concerning the murder of the Jews.

The meeting is described in Ohlendorf's testimony at the Einsatzgruppen Trial No. 9 at Nuremberg. It is also mentioned in the affidavit by Dr. Walter Blume, who headed SK 7a:

SD, and Streckenbach, head of Office I of the Reich Security Main Office (RSHA), lectured on the duties of the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos. At this time we were already being instructed about the tasks of exterminating the Jews. It was stated that Eastern Jewry was the intellectual reservoir of Bolshevism and, therefore, in the Fuhrer's opinion, must be exterminated. This speech was given before a small, select audience. Although I cannot remember the individuals present, I assume that many of the Einsatzgruppe and Sonderkommando chiefs were present.

Another briefing was given by Heydrich at a meeting of the leaders of the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos which took place on June 17. There again, the Fuhrer's order concerning the murder of the Jews was discussed, as stated by Standartenfuhrer Dr. Walter Blume:

"I heard another speech by Heydrich in the Prinz Albrecht Palace in Berlin, in the course of which he again emphasized these points." Ervin Schulz, head of EK-5, testified at the Nuremberg trials that:

"Some time during the first ten days of June 1941, the chiefs of the Einsatzgruppen and leaders of the Kommandos were called to the RSHA in the Prinz Albrecht Palace to hear a speech by Heydrich in which he outlined the policy to be adopted, giving us some guidelines concerning the fulfillments of the tasks imposed upon the Einsatzgruppen."

At the third meeting, which probably took place shortly before June 22, high-level SS and Police chiefs met in the office of the chief of Order Police, General Kurt Daluege. As Heydrich was unable to attend, he sent them a memorandum dated July 2, 1941 (dated after the invasion of the Soviet Union), specifying who was to be eliminated.

Spector - Einsatzgruppen Pg. 7-8
EINSATZGRUPPEN (BLUME) JUNE 1941

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO-4145 - PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 10

AFFIDAVIT OF WALTER BLUME, 29 JUNE 1947*

AFFIDAVIT

I, Walter Blume, swear, depose, and state -

1. I was born on 23 July 1906 in Dortmund. I attended the elementary school and the Real gymnasium and graduated in Dortmund in 1919. I then studied law for three years at the Universities of Bonn, Jena, and Muenster and passed my first law examination. Then followed a further three years' training in Hamm and Dortmund and, in 1932, I passed the bar examination in Berlin. In April 1933 I obtained my doctor's degree at Erlangen. I was thereupon engaged by the commissioner of police in Dortmund for information purposes and remained there until about May 1934. Shortly before the Roehm revolt I was appointed as a government administration officer to act as chief of the State Police Office at Dortmund. After the Roehm revolt I was transferred to the then Prussian Secret Police Office. I remained there until Spring 1935. Until Autumn 1937 I was in charge of the State Police Office at Halle/Saale and until the beginning of 1939 I was in charge of the State Police Office in Berlin until immediately before the beginning of the Russian campaign. In June 1941 I was assigned to Deuben and until approximately the middle of August I was chief of the Sonderkommando 7a in Einsatzgruppe "B". In August 1941, I was recalled to the Reich Security Main Office as personnel referent and remained there until June or July 1942. After an assignment which occupied me for one and a half months in Feldes, I became inspector of the security police in Dusseldorf. I carried on this employment until August 1943. I then went to Athens as commander in chief of the security police and remained there for about one year. After that I was for a time without employment and was later ordered to take over the frontier police in office I of the Reich Security Main Office. At the beginning of 1945, I was sent by office IV to Bad Blankenburg, in order to take over the direction of the censorship department there and extend it. I could not complete this assignment, as I withdrew in the direction of Salzburg to the Waffen SS and was taken prisoner along with them. After spending a year as a prisoner in American hands, I was released from prison, having remained silent on the subject of my activity in the security police, and until my arrest in the Summer of 1947 I lived under my own name as a servant to a farmer.

2. I have been a member of the NSDAP since 1 May 1933. My party number is 3,282,505. I have been a member of the SS since the summer of 1934 or 1935. My SS number is 267,224.
3. During the setting up of the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos during the months of May-June 1941 I was at Dueben. During June, Heydrich, Chief of the Security Police and SD, and Streckenbach, head of office I of the Reich Security Main Office, held lectures on the duties of the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos. At this time we were already being instructed about tasks of exterminating the Jews. It was stated that Eastern Jewry was the intellectual reservoir of bolshevism and, therefore, in the Fuehrer's opinion, must be exterminated. This speech was made to a small, selected audience. Although I cannot remember the individuals present, I assume that many of the Einsatzgruppen chief and Einsatz and Sonderkommandos chief were present. I heard another speech by Heydrich in the Prinz Albrecht Palace in Berlin, in the course of which he again emphasised these points.

4. As chief of Sonderkommando 7a I carried out one execution in the course of my duty. I remember one occasion on which between 70-80 people were executed in Vitebsk and another occasion on which a similar number were executed in Minsk. On the latter occasion I only received a direct order from Nebe, chief of Einsatzgruppe B, to find out whether this execution had taken place. I was not present during the whole execution, but convinced myself that it was carried out. In both cases a kind of trench was dug; the persons destined to die were placed in front of it and shot with carbines. About 10 people were shot simultaneously by an execution force of 30-40 men. There was no doctor present at the execution, but the leader of the execution force who was responsible made sure that the people were dead. Coups de grace were not necessary. Neither was there in my unit any specialist in the art of shooting in the neck. I did not take part in any further mass execution.

5. I received all orders regarding executions, direction, and duties of Sonderkommando 7a, which was subordinate to me in Dueben or in the Prinz Albrecht Palace in Berlin. During the campaign I never received any further orders.

6. I do not know by whom the reports of the Einsatzgruppen were compiled in Berlin.

Nuernberg, 29 June 1947

(Signed) WALTER BLUME
EXTRACT FROM GUIDELINES BY HEYDRICH FOR HIGHER SS AND POLICE LEADERS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
OF THE SOVIET UNION, JULY 2, 1941

Berlin, July 2, 1941

Chief of the Security Police and the SD
B. No IV -1100/41 top secret
B. No. g. Rs. 7/41

EK 3

Reich Secret Document

a) To the Higher SS and Police Leader (Hoherer SS-und Polizeiführer)
SS Obergruppenführer Jeckeln...
b) To the Higher SS and Police Leader
SS Gruppenführer von dem Bach...
c) To the Higher SS and Police Leader
SS Gruppenführer Prutzmann...
d) To the Higher SS and Police Leader
SS Oberführer Korsemann...

Owing to the fact that the Chief of the Order Police invited to
Berlin the Higher SS and Police Leaders and commissioned them to
take part in Operation Barbarossa without informing me of this in
time, I was unfortunately not in a position also to provide them
with basic instructions for the sphere of jurisdiction of the
Security Police and SD.

In the following I make known briefly the most important
instructions given by me to the Einsatzgruppen and Komandos of
the Security Police and the SD, with the request to take note of
them.

All the following are to be executed:

Officials of the Comintern (together with professional Communist
politicians in general)

top and medium-level officials and radical lower-level officials
of the Party, Central Committee and district and sub-district
committees

People's Commissars

Jews in Party and State employment, and other radical elements
(saboteurs, propagandists, snipers, assassins, inciters, etc.)

in so far as they are, in any particular case, required or no
longer required, to supply information on political or economic
matters which are of special importance for the further
operations of the Security Police, or for the economic
reconstruction of the Occupied Territories...

Documents pg. 377-8
8.

GORING ORDERS HEYDRICH TO PREPARE A PLAN
"FOR THE FINAL SOLUTION OF THE JEWISH PROBLEM."
JULY 31, 1941

To the Chief of the Security Police and the SD,
SS Gruppenfuhrer Heydrich
Berlin

In completion of the task which was entrusted to you in the Edict
dated January 24, 1939, of solving the Jewish question by means
of emigration or evacuation in the most convenient way possible,
given the present conditions, I herewith charge you with making
all necessary preparations with regard to organizational,
practical and financial aspects for an overall solution
(Gesamtlösung) of the Jewish question in the German sphere of
influence in Europe.

Insofar as the competencies of other central organizations are
affected, these are to be involved.

I further charge you with submitting to me promptly an overall
plan of the preliminary organizational, practical
and financial measures for the execution of the intended final
solution (Endlösung) of the Jewish question.

Goring

Documents Pg 233
A CODED MESSAGE – AUGUST 1941

On 23 October, five days after the departure of the first RSHA convoy of Jews out of Berlin, Eichmann's immediate superior, SS-Brigadeführer Heinrich Muller of the Gestapo, issued a related set of instructions to the offices of the Sipo (Sicherheitspolizei, or Security Police) and the SD (Sicherheitsdienst, or Security Service). This same Gestapo chief, on 1 August 1941, had wired coded instructions to the commanders of the four Einsatzgruppen in the East. "It was doubtless "the Führer's wish" to be continually updated on the mass shootings conducted by Einsatzgruppen A, B, C, and D."

(Hitler and the Final Solution – Gerald Fleming, pg. 45)
the October trip, is also suggested by Eichmann's letter of August 28, 1941, which adds to the old formulation about the imminent Final Solution the ominous phrase "now in preparation."
That this plan "now in preparation" did not involve mass "resettlement" in Russia as hypothesized by Adam and Broszat is indicated by Eichmann's reply two weeks later to a Foreign Office inquiry over the possibility of deporting Serbian Jews to the east. The Foreign Office notation of Eichmann's telephone response reads: "According to the information of Sturmbannfuhrer Eichmann....residence in Russia and GG (General Government) impossible. Not even the Jews from Germany can be lodged there. Eichmann proposes shooting."

Browning - Fateful months, pg. 26
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT L-180 PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 34

EXTRACTS FROM REPORT OF EINSATZGRUPPE A
COVERING THE PERIOD FROM
23 JUNE 1941 TO 15 OCTOBER 1941
DR. STAHLECKER

EINSATZGRUPPE A
Comprehensive Report up to 15 October 1941

I. Table of Contents
II. Activities in police matters
   A. Organizational measures
   B. Clearing and securing the operational area
   C. Counter-espionage
   D. Control over persons and indexing
   E. Criminal police work

III. Situation Report
   A. Situation before the invasion by German forces
   B. General conditions in the spheres of life up to 15 October 1941
   C. Jewish influence on the general conditions of life in the eastern territory (Ostland)

IV. Grievances and proposals for their remedy
   A: The Baltic Area

II. Clearing and safeguarding of the area of operations

1. Instigation of self-clearing operations

Considering that the population of the Baltic countries had suffered very heavily under the government of Bolshevism and Jewry while they were incorporated in the USSR, it was to be expected that after the liberation from that foreign government, they (i.e. the population themselves) would render harmless most
of the enemies left behind after the retreat of the Red Army. It was the duty of the security police to set in motion these self-clearing movements and to direct them into the correct channels in order to accomplish the purpose of the clearing operations as quickly as possible. It was no less important in view of the future to establish the unshakable and provable fact that the liberated population themselves took the most severe measures against the Bolshevist and Jewish enemy quite on their own, so that the directive by German authorities could not be found out.

In Lithuania this was achieved for the first time by partisan activities in Kovno. To our surprise it was not easy at first to set in motion an extensive program against Jews. Klimatis, the leader of the partisan unit mentioned above, who was used for this purpose primarily, succeeded in starting a program on the basis of advice given to him by a small advanced detachment (Vorkommando) operating in Kovno, and in such a way that no German order or German instigation was noticed from the outside. During the first program in the night from 25 to 26 June, the Lithuanian partisans did away with more than 1,500 Jews, set fire to several synagogues or destroyed them by other means and burned down a Jewish dwelling district consisting of about 60 houses. During the following nights about 2,300 Jews were made harmless in a similar way. In other parts of Lithuania similar actions followed the example of Kovno, though smaller and extending to the Communists who had been left behind.

These self-clearing operations went smoothly because the army authorities, who had been informed, showed understanding for this procedure. From the beginning it was obvious that only the first days after the occupation would offer the opportunity for carrying out pogroms. After the disarmament of the partisans the self-clearing operations automatically ceased.

It proved much more difficult to set in motion similar clearing operations in Latvia. The essential reason was that the entire stratum of national leaders had been assassinated or deported by the Soviets, especially in Riga. It was possible though, through similar influences, for the Latvian auxiliary police to set in motion a pogrom against Jews also in Riga. During this pogrom all synagogues were destroyed and about 400 Jews were killed. As the population of Riga quieted down quickly, further pogroms were not feasible.

So far as possible, both in Kovno and in Riga evidence by film and photography was established that the first spontaneous executions of Jews and Communists were carried out by Lithuanians and Latvians.

In Estonia, by reason of the relatively small number of Jews, no opportunity presented itself for the instigation of pogroms. The Estonian home guard rendered harmless only some individual communists whom they especially hated, but generally they limited themselves to carrying out arrests.

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3. **Action against Jewry**

From the beginning, it was to be expected that the Jewish problem in the East could not be solved by pogroms alone. In accordance with the basic orders received, however, the clearing activities of the security police had to aim at a complete annihilation of the Jews. Sonderkommandos reinforced by selected units - in Lithuania partisan detachments, in Latvia units of the Latvian auxiliary police - therefore performed extensive executions both in the towns and in rural areas. The operations of the execution detachments were performed smoothly. When attaching Lithuanian and Latvian detachments to the execution squads, men were chosen whose relatives had been murdered or deported by the Russians. Especially severe and extensive measures became necessary in Lithuania. In some places - especially in Kovno - the Jews had armed themselves and participated actively in guerrilla warfare and committed arson. Besides these activities, the Jews in Lithuania had collaborated most actively hand in glove with the Soviets. The sum total of Jews liquidated in Lithuania amounts to 71,105.

During the pogroms in Kovno, 3,800 Jews were eliminated, in the smaller towns about 1,200 Jews.

Apart from organizing and carrying out measures of execution, the creation of ghettos was begun in the larger towns at once during the first days of operations. This was especially urgent in Kovno because there were 30,000 Jews in total population of 152,400. Therefore, at the end of the first pogrom a Jewish committee was summoned who were informed that the German authorities so far had not seen any reason to interfere in the quarrels between Lithuanians and Jews. The sole basis for creating a normal situation would be to construct a Jewish ghetto. Against remonstrations made by the Jewish committee, it was declared that there was no other possibility to prevent further pogroms. On this the Jews at once declared themselves ready to do everything in their power to transfer their co-racials to the town district of Villampol which was intended as a Jewish ghetto and with the greatest possible speed. This town district lies in the triangle between the Memel river and a tributary; it is connected with Kovno by a bridge only and can, therefore, easily be locked off.

In the other towns with a larger Jewish population ghettos shall be established likewise.

Marking of the Jews by a yellow star, to be worn on the breast and back which was ordered in the first instance by provisional orders of the security police was carried out within a short time on the basis of regulations issued by the commander of the rear army area and later by the civil administration.
Enclosure 8: Survey of the number of executed persons

<table>
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<th>Area</th>
<th>Jews</th>
<th>Communists</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Kovno town and surroundings</td>
<td>31,914</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>31,994</td>
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<td>Shaulyai</td>
<td>41,382</td>
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<td>Vilnyus</td>
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<td>7,032</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>80,311</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>81,171</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Riga town and surroundings</td>
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<td>Yelgava</td>
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<td>Vaimesa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Daugavpils</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ruthenia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>118,430</td>
<td>3,387</td>
<td>121,817</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To be added to these figures:

In Lithuania and Latvia Jews annihilated by pogroms... 5,500
Jews, Communists and partisans executed in old Russian area 2,000
Lunatics executed 748

(Correct total - 130,065) 122,455

Communists and Jews liquidated by State Police and Security Service Tilsit during search actions 5,502

135,567
The Grand Mufti first thanked the Fuhrer for the great honor of a personal reception. He further wished to take the opportunity to express his gratitude on behalf of the entire Arab world, particularly for the continual interest in Arab, and especially Palestinian affairs which the great Fuhrer of the Grossdeutsche Reich (Greater German Reich) had demonstrated, and for the unequivocal support he had shown in his public speeches. The Arab nations were deeply convinced that Germany would win the war, and that the interests of the Arab world would consequently be safeguarded. The Arabs were, moreover, natural allies of Germany, as could be seen by their mutual enemies: the British, the Jews, and the communists. As a result the Arabs were prepared to collaborate wholeheartedly with Germany and to lend support to the war effort, not only through perpetrating acts of sabotage and encouraging political destabilizations, but materially, by forming an Arab Legion. The Arabs would make better allies than perhaps it would seem at first, both in light of geographical considerations and because of the sufferings that the British and Jews had inflicted on the Arabs. In addition, the Arabs had close ties with all Muslim nations, which could also benefit the common cause. The Arab Legion could be mustered with ease. An appeal by the Mufti to the Arab nations and the prisoners of Arabic, Algerian, Tunisian, and Moroccan nationality who were currently held in Germany would yield a multitude of combat-ready volunteers. The Arab world was firmly convinced of a German victory, by virtue not only of the large army, brave soldiers, and brilliant military strategists at Germany's disposal, but also because Allah could never grant victory to an unjust cause. The Arabs were seeking to win independence and unity for Palestine, Syria, and Iraq from this war. They had full confidence in the Fuhrer, who could heal the wounds inflicted on the Arab nations by Germany's enemies.

The Mufti then recalled a document he had received from the German government, which stated that Germany had occupied no Arabic lands, that it recognized and sympathized with the Arab struggles for independence and liberation, and that it would support the elimination of the national Jewish homeland. A public declaration today to this same effect would be of immense propagandistic value in the campaign to mobilize the Arab nations... The Fuhrer responded that the fundamental attitude of Germany toward these issues was self-evident. Germany had declared an uncompromising war on the Jews. Such a commitment naturally entailed a stiff opposition to the Jewish homeland in Palestine, a cause that had become the political rallying point for Jewish interests and their destructive influence. Germany also knew the allegation that the Jews were playing the part of
economic pioneers in Palestine to be false. There only the Arabs worked, not the Jews. Germany was determined to challenge the European nations one by one into a settlement of the Jewish question, and, when the time came, Germany would turn to the non-European peoples with the same call.

At the present time, Germany was engaged in a life-or-death struggle against the two power bases of Jewry, Britain and Russia. In theory, the economic systems of Britain and Russia were polar opposites, but in practice, Jewry in both countries was pursuing a common objective. The present war was of decisive importance: politically, it represented a conflict of interests between Germany and England; ideologically, it represented a showdown between National Socialism and Judaism. Of course, Germany was prepared to offer positive and practical aid to its Arabian partners, who were faced with the same contest. For, in a struggle for existence, especially where the Jews could enlist the assistance of the British war machine for their own purposes, platonic assurances were pointless...The Fuhrer then made the following declaration, requesting the Mufti to lock it deep in his heart:

1. He (the Fuhrer) would carry on the fight until the last traces of the Jewish-communist European hegemony had been obliterated.

2. In the course of this fight, the German army would - at a time that could not yet be specified, but in any case in the clearly foreseeable future - gain the southern exist of the Caucasus.

3. As soon as this breakthrough was made, the Fuhrer would offer the Arab world his personal assurance that the hour of liberation had struck. Thereafter, Germany's only remaining objective in the region would be limited to the annihilation of the Jews living under British protection in Arab lands.

Fleming, pg. 101-104
13. CHELMNO, DECEMBER 1941. BELZEC, NOVEMBER 1941

Let us examine the Chelmno evidence first. Since early 1940 a Sonderkommando under Herbert Lange, headquartered in Posen, had been carrying out euthanasia operations in East Prussia and the incorporated territories. According to Lange's chauffeur, he drove the Sonderkommando chief around the Warthegau in the fall of 1941 searching for a suitable location for a death camp. He then drove Lange to Berlin and back, arriving in Chelmno in late October or early November. Thereafter a team of SS men was assembled from Posen and Lodz, followed by a guard detachment of Order Police. A work force of Polish prisoners from Lodz together with local inhabitants was put to work renovating and fencing the old villa or Schloss, where the Jews would be undressed and loaded into the waiting gas vans. After preparations were complete, the gassing began on December 8.

Polish postwar interrogations of the Volksdeutsche (ethnic German) inhabitants of the village provide the same sequence. According to the Amtskommissar of Chelmno, he was away from town toward the end of 1941 when some SS men arrived and investigated the Schloss and other buildings. Some days later, after his return, Lange appeared and confiscated various buildings. Lange returned still later with a team of SS-men, followed by police. Some weeks after the arrival of the SS-unit, work of the Schloss was complete and the first truckloads of Jews arrived. Such a sequence of events would necessitate Lange's having received his initial instructions to establish a death camp at Chelmno no later than mid - late October but more likely toward the beginning of the month.

The sequence of events at Belzec leads to much the same conclusion. Again we have the testimony of only one German defendant, Josef Oberhauser initially an employee of the euthanasia program and subsequently adjutant to Christian Wirth, the inspector of the Polish death camps of Operation Reinhard. Oberhauser was assigned to Globocnik in Lublin in October and arrived there in November 1941. His first job consisted of bringing to Belzec building materials as well as Ukrainian guardsmen from their training camp at Trawniki. He was in no doubt as to what was intended in Belzec, as the construction supervisor showed him the plans for the gas chamber. By Christmas the initial construction was finished, and Oberhauser became Wirth's liaison to Globocnik. After the first gassing test killed fifty Jewish workers, Wirth went to Berlin for six weeks. Upon his return in March, the first transports began to arrive.

According to local inhabitants, three SS men came to Belzec in October 1941 and demanded a draft of twenty Polish workers. Work began on November 1 under the direction of a young ethnic German Baumeister from Kattowitz, who supervised the construction
according to a set of plans. After putting up two barracks and the future gas chamber near the railway siding, the Polish workers were dismissed on December 23. By then, black-uniformed former Russian prisoners of war had arrived to carry on the work and guard seventy Jewish laborers. After more barracks, guard towers, and fencing were completed, the Jewish workers were killed in the first test of the gassing facilities in February 1942. Full-time operations then began in March. Thus not only is the Oberhauser testimony confirmed, but an Eichmann visit to an empty camp at Belzec in October 1941 and his reception by a lone police captain fits this sequence of events precisely. The few wooden buildings he saw must have dated from the former Jewish labor camp at Belzec.

Browning - pg. 29-30)
14. INVITATION TO WANNSEE CONFERENCE

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 709-PS
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 2506

TWO LETTERS FROM HEYDRICH TO HOFMANN, CHIEF OF RACE AND
RESETTLEMENT MAIN OFFICE, 29 NOVEMBER 1941 AND 8 JANUARY 1942,
CONCERNING A FORTHCOMING CONFERENCE AT WANNSEE TO DISCUSS THE
"FINAL SOLUTION" OF THE JEWISH QUESTION IN EUROPE AND NOTING THAT
OFFICIALS INVITED INCLUDE DEFENDANT STUCKART, LUTHER OF FOREIGN
OFFICE, AND KRITZINGER OF THE REICH CHANCELLERY

1. Letter of 29 November 1941

Berlin SW 11 29 Nov 1941
Prinz Albrecht Str. 8
Telephone: Local 120040
Long Distance 126421
Personal

Chief of the Security Police and the Security Service (SD)
IVB 4-307641 Secret (1180)
Request to mention in answer above
marking and date
(Handwritten) To the Files (Initial) H 24 January.
(Confidential)

To SS Gruppenfuehrer Hofmann
Race and Settlement Main Office,
Berlin

Dear Hofmann:

On the 31 July 1941 the Reich Marshal of the Greater German Reich
commissioned me to make all necessary preparations in
organizational, factual, and material respect for the total
solution (Gesamtkloesung) of the Jewish question in Europe with the
participation of all interested central agencies and to present
to him a master plan as soon as possible. A photostatic copy of
this commission is included in this letter. Considering the
extraordinary importance which has to be conceded to these
questions and in the interest of the achievement of the same
viewpoint by the central agencies concerned with the remaining
work connected with this final solution (Endlosung), I suggest
to make these problems the subject of a combined conversation,
especially since Jews are being evacuated in continuous
transports from the Reich territory, including the Protectorate
Bohemia and Moravia, to the East ever since 15 October 1941.
I therefore invite you to such a conference, followed by luncheon on 9 December 1941, 1200 hours, at the office of the International Criminal Police Commission, Berlin, Am Grossen (handwritten) Kleinen (crossed out) Wannsee No. 16 (crossed out) 56/58 (handwritten).

(Handwritten in margin) According to conversation with SS Major Guenther on 4 December 1941, street was changed.

I have sent similar letters to Governor General Dr. Frank, Gauleiter Dr. Meyer, State Secretaries Stuckart, Dr. Schlegelberger, Gutterer, and Neumann, as well as to ReichsAmtsleiter Dr. Leibrandt, under State Secretary Luther, SS Major General Greifelt, SS Senior Colonel Klopfer, and Ministerial Director Kitzinger.

Heil Hitler!
Yours,
(Signed) Heydrich

Trials of Criminals, NMT Vol XIII - pg. 192
15. **LETTER OF 8 JANUARY 1942, POSTPONING THE DATE OF THE WANNSEE CONFERENCE TO 20 JANUARY 1942**

Chief of the Security Police and the Security Service (SD)  
Prague, 8 January 1942  
C.d.S. B. No. 18/42  
(Initial) H 13 January  
(Handwritten) Submit on 19 January

To SS Major General Hofmann  
Race and Settlement Main Office,  
Berlin  
Hedemannstr.

Dear Hofmann!

Unfortunately, at the last minute, I had to call off the conference, scheduled for 9 December 1941, about the questions of final solution of the Jewish problem because of events which suddenly became known and of the engrossment with them of some of the invited gentlemen.

Since the questions needing settlement do not allow further postponement, I therefore again invite you to a conference followed by luncheon on 20 January 1942 at 1200 hours, Berlin, Am Grossen Wannsee 56-58.

The group of invited gentlemen, mentioned in my last letter of invitation, remains unchanged.

Heil Hitler!  
Yours, (Signed) HEYDRICH

**Trials of War Criminals**  
NMT Vol XIII, pg. 192-199
"Ostland" and Army Group Rear Areas North and Center:

An Einsatzgruppe A Draft report (Winter 1941/42) listed the following figures of Jews killed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Figures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>136,421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Russia</td>
<td>41,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Einsatzgruppe B reported, on November 14, 1941, an incomplete tabulation of 45,467 shootings. Kube reported on July 31, 1942, the killing of 65,000 Jews during the preceding two months of operations.

Ukraine, Bialystok, Army Group Rear Area South, and Rear Area Eleventh Army:

Einsatzgruppe C reported that two of its Kommandos (4a and 5) had killed 95,000 people up to the beginning of December, 1941. Einsatzgruppe D reported on April 8, 1942, a total of 92,000 dead. Himmler reported to Hitler on December 20, 1942, the following numbers of Jews shot in the Ukraine, South Russia, and Bialystok:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Figures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August, 1942</td>
<td>31,246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September, 1942</td>
<td>165,282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October, 1942</td>
<td>95,735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November, 1942</td>
<td>70,948</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 363,211

These partial figures, none of which overlap, account for 900,000 dead Jews. Other fragmentary reports, most of which we have cited in this chapter, and which deal with the operations of the Higher SS and Police Leaders, the BdS Krakow, the German and Romanian Armies, the Bandenkampfverbände, and SS and Police killings not covered by the figures cited above, account for an additional 250,000 Jewish dead. The resultant figure (1,150,000), still does not cover the entire area of the mobile killing operations for all periods. When we supply an estimate for the gaps in our sources, the total number of Jews killed in this venture rises to 1,400,000.

From Hilberg — pg. 245
PROTOCOL OF THE WANNSEE CONFERENCE
JANUARY 20, 1942

Reich Secret Document
30 copies

PROTOCOL OF CONFERENCE

1. The following took part in the conference on the final solution (Endlosung) of the Jewish question held on January 20, 1942, in Berlin, Am Grossen Wannsee No. 56-58:

Gauleiter DR. MEYER and Reich Office
Director DR. LEIBBRAND

Reich Ministry for the
Eastern Territories

Secretary of State DR. STUCKART

Reich Ministry of the
Interior

Secretary of State NEUMANN

Plenipotentiary for
the Four Year Plan

Secretary of State DR. FREISLER

Reich Ministry of
Justice

Secretary of State DR. BUHLER

Office of the Governor
General

Undersecretary of State DR. LUTHER

Foreign Ministry

SS Oberfuhrer KLOPFER

Party Chancellery

Ministerial Director KRITZINGE

Party Chancellery

SS Gruppenfuhrer MULLER

Reich Security Main Office

SS Oberstrumbannfuhrer EICHMANN

Reich Security Main Office

SS Oberfuhrer DR. SCHONGART

Security Police and SD

Commander of the Security Police
and the SD in the Government-
General

SS Oberfuhrer DR. LANG

Security Police and SD

Commander of the Security Police
and the SD in the Generalbezirk
Latvia as representative of the
Commander of the Security Police
and the SD for the Reichskommissariat for the Ostland

SS REINHARD HEYDRICH

Head of Security Police,
Security Service, and later
Reich Security Main Office
(RSHA)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Zander - 1937</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Altreich</td>
<td>131,800</td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ostmark (Eastern Territories 420,000)</td>
<td>190,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Government-General 2,284,000)</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Bialystok 400,000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protectorate of Bohemia &amp; Moravia 74,200</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Estonia-free of Jews)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>96,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Lithuania 34,000)</td>
<td></td>
<td>165,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>43,000</td>
<td>75,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>5,600</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupied territory</td>
<td>165,000</td>
<td>220,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unoccupied territory</td>
<td>700,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>69,600</td>
<td>75,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>160,800</td>
<td>135,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>48,000</td>
<td>48,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>330,000</td>
<td>300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td>1,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>5,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy including Sardinia</td>
<td>58,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugo- ) slavia)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumania-including</td>
<td>342,000</td>
<td>900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bessarabia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>6,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>24,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>Yugoslav</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugo- ) slavia)</td>
<td></td>
<td>77,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chech.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>88,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey (in Europe)</td>
<td>55,500</td>
<td>60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>742,800</td>
<td>450,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine 2,994,684</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,750,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Byelorussia, 445,484</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>without</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bialystok</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>11,000,000</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
WHAT HAPPENED TO THE PARTICIPANTS OF THE WANNSEE CONFERENCE

1. Gauleiter Dr. Meyer - Committee suicide in 1945
2. Dr. Leibbrandt - Proceedings before German court in Nuremberg discontinued in 1950 - free
3. Dr. Stuckart - Tried and sentenced. Due to ill health, sentence reduced to a fine of 500 marks. Killed in auto accident in 1953
4. Neumann - Fate unknown
5. Dr. Freisler - Reported killed in aircraft in 1945
6. Dr. Buhler - Condemned to death in Poland. Executed 1948
7. Dr. Luther - Purged. Died in concentration camp
8. Klopfer - Reported at liberty 1960
9. Kritzinger - Reported at liberty after illness - free
11. Muller - Missing
12. Eichmann - Tried and executed in Israel, 1961
13. Dr. Schongarth - Condemned to death by British court 1946
14. Dr. Lange - Reported escaped from British detention 1949 to Buenos Aires
15. Reinhard Heydrich - Killed in Czechoslovakia May 1942

Tried - 5 (hanged 3)
Suicide and killed - 4
Free, escaped or missing - 5
Fate unknown - 1

Hilberg pp. 704-715
Sources:


